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Introduction 
This chapter examines the importance of legitimacy for international organizations,
1
 
and their efforts to legitimate themselves vis-à-vis different audiences. Legitimacy, which for 
decades barely featured in the scholarly analysis of international organizations, has since the 
late 1990s been an increasingly important lens through which the processes, practices, and 
structures of international organizations have been examined. The growing emphasis on the 
legitimacy of international organizations has not been limited to scholars, but extends to 
political commentators, politicians, and representatives of international organizations. 
Legitimacy has become a common currency in contemporary discourses about international 
organizations.  
Tis emphasis on legitimacy raises several important questions for the study of international 
organizations. Why has the legitimacy of international organizations become the focus of 
such attention? Why, and how, is legitimacy supposed to matter for them? And if it matters, 
how do international organizations go about building or defending their legitimacy? This 
chapter aims to address some of these questions, with particular focus on the last of these: 
how do international organizations go about legitimating themselves vis-à-vis different 
audiences, and for what purpose? It makes three main arguments. First, it argues that in most 
international organizations the most important actors engaging in legitimation efforts are not 
the supranational bureaucracies, but member states. This has important implications for our 
understanding of the purposes of seeking legitimacy, and for the possible practices. Second, 
legitimacy and legitimation serve a range of purposes for these states, beyond achieving 
greater compliance with their decisions, which has been one of the key functional logics 
                                                 
1
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highlighted for legitimacy in the literature.
2
 Instead, legitimacy is frequently sought to 
exclude outsiders from the functional or territorial domains affected by an international 
organization’s authority, or to maintain external material and political support for existing 
arrangements. Third, one of the most prominent legitimation efforts, institutional reforms, 
often prioritizes form over function, with international organizations engaging in what the 
development economist Matt Andrews has called “isomorphic mimicry”, where reforms are 
not aimed at changing the underlying political structures and dynamics, but at signalling to 
important and powerful audiences to encourage their continued material and political 
support.
3
  
To advance these arguments, the chapter is divided into four sections. It will start with 
developing the concept of legitimacy and its application to international organizations, and 
then ask why their legitimacy has become such an important intellectual and political concern 
in recent years. The second part will look in more detail at the legitimation practices of 
international organizations, focusing on who engages in these practices, who the key 
audiences are, and how legitimation claims are advanced. The third section will look in more 
detail at one of the most common forms of legitimation – institutional reform – through the 
lens of two such reforms in international organizations: efforts towards greater 
interoperability in NATO, and the establishment of the African Peace and Security 
Architecture in the African Union (AU). The chapter will conclude with some reflections of 
the contribution that a legitimacy perspective has made to our understanding of the practices 
of international organizations.  
Legitimacy and International Organizations 
An institution is legitimate if its power is justified in terms of moral and other socially 
embedded beliefs, and if those subject to its rule recognize that it should be obeyed.
4
 
Legitimacy is therefore an inherently intersubjective and social concept. Thus, legitimacy is 
rooted in the collective beliefs of a particular community, which gives these beliefs a certain 
degree of stability, but also means that legitimacy can only be assessed with respect to this 
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particular group: legitimacy judgements are not universal.
5
 Substantive understandings of 
what constitutes legitimacy are sustained and changed through the actions of those in an 
authority relationship: legitimacy needs to be recognized by those subject to rule and needs 
to be claimed and justified by those exercising authority.  
Such an understanding of legitimacy highlights that it is problematic to neatly distinguish 
between what Robert Keohane and Allen Buchanan call the normative dimension of 
legitimacy (the right to rule) and the sociological dimension of legitimacy (a widely held 
belief in the right to rule).
6
 An institution’s sociological legitimacy, ascribed as the result of 
the congruence of the institution’s objectives and practices with the beliefs, values, and 
expectations that provide a justification for its power, is judged on the basis of certain 
normative suppositions. Normative legitimacy, on the other hand, is usually ascribed to an 
institution if its structure, processes, and actions fulfil particular normative criteria, such as 
being based on some expression of consent, institutional integrity, or the promotion of 
justice. These criteria, however, are not universal and change over time: they arise as a 
consequence of social processes of argumentation, persuasion, and socialization, and are 
subject to social change. Both the normative and sociological dimensions of legitimacy are 
therefore inextricably interlinked. 
An arguably more useful way to unpack the concept of legitimacy is therefore to examine 
what kinds of underlying beliefs contribute to an institution’s legitimacy. The legitimacy 
literature has identified three types of belief in particular that give rise to different forms of 
legitimacy. The first are what Fritz Scharpf has called “output legitimacy”: shared beliefs 
about normatively desirable outcomes, and the ability of institutions to achieve them.
7
 In the 
case of international organizations, these could be welfare gains from co-operation and the 
establishment of common standards, the promotion of human rights, or restrictions on the 
use of force, or on the production and use of certain kinds of weapons, to name just a few.  
Failing to achieve these outcomes or changes in the underlying beliefs as to what outcomes 
are normatively desirable can lead to challenges to an organization’s legitimacy. 
A second set of beliefs relates to what has been called process legitimacy: the ways in which 
power is exercised, the processes by which rulers are selected and by which decisions are 
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made, and the processes that ensure that power is exercised in a procedurally fair manner.
8
 
With regard to international organizations, such beliefs about legitimizing processes can 
entail the equal application of rules to all member states, transparency in decision-making 
and opportunity for participation, or processes ensuring adequate representation, e.g., on a 
regional basis.  
The final set of legitimating beliefs are beliefs about the identity and particular qualities of 
an institution, contributing to what Mark Sutchman has called “structural legitimacy”.9 In 
Sutchman’s words, “[t]he structurally legitimate organization becomes a repository of public 
confidence because it is ‘the right organization for the job.’”10 An international 
organization’s structural legitimacy might arise from shared beliefs about its epistemic 
capacities, its perceived ability to muster particular resources and expertise, or from certain 
qualities of its membership, such as the involvement of regional powers, or the democratic 
character of member states.  
Why does legitimacy matter for international organizations? 
Legitimacy is widely seen as a motivation for compliance: because it instils a notion of 
obligation rooted in the perception that a legitimate institution’s demands are normatively 
appropriate, actors comply even in the absence of coercion or material rewards. As a source 
of compliance, legitimacy is very attractive: as it does not rely on constant monitoring or on 
material rewards, its costs are generally thought to be lower than those of coercion or 
incentives. In addition, it is argued to be more durable, as it is not vulnerable to shocks 
limiting the availability of coercion or incentives.
11
  
Legitimacy, of course, is only one possible source of compliance. The most prominent 
international actors, states, have a range of options to induce compliance of either their 
citizens or of other states with their requests: in addition to the normative pull of legitimacy, 
most states have the resources to either coerce or incentivize compliance, especially of their 
citizens. However, as Inis Claude observed, most states combine the use of coercion or 
incentives with appeals to legitimacy: “lovers of naked power are far less typical than those 
who aspire to clothe themselves in the mantle of legitimate authority; emperors may be nude, 
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but they do not like to be so, and think of themselves so, or to be so regarded”.12 Most 
international organizations, however, do not have the privilege of being able use naked 
power, as they lack the coercive capacities and economic resources of states. Hence, they are 
likely to rely strongly on legitimacy to achieve compliance with their rules and decisions.
13
  
Given the focus on compliance, the primary legitimacy relationship with regard to 
international organizations that is highlighted in the literature is the one between 
organizations and their members, after all they tend to be the ones most directly affected by 
the authority of international organizations. However, as will be examined in more detail 
below, many international organizations also need to seek support and recognition from 
either powerful non-member states or from other international organizations in the sense that 
they do not interfere into an organization’s functional and territorial domains, or seek active 
material support from them for their activities. When examining the purposes of seeking 
legitimacy and engaging in legitimation, it is therefore important to consider a wider range of 
audiences rather than just member states and their compliance. 
Legitimacy questions also matter because tend to be asked at times of crisis, when 
institutional arrangements are questioned either by those participating in them (e.g., members 
of international organizations) or by those outside it.
14
 Such crises can have multiple reasons 
– they can be the consequence of sudden shocks that completely change the environment 
within which particular international organizations work (such as the end of the Cold War, or 
the global financial crisis), or they can be the consequence of gradual changes in international 
society. Such gradual changes can affect both the material environment within which 
organizations operate (e.g., the emergence of new great powers, and its implications for the 
balance of power) and the normative environment (e.g., a greater prominence of human 
rights). As Veijo Heiskanen suggests in his introduction to one of the first major explorations 
of the legitimacy of international organizations: 
  Over the past fifty years, fundamental changes have taken place in the 
operating environment of these international organizations… As a result of 
these changes, many international organizations… have been struggling to 
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maintain or re-establish the role that they once were perceived, or expected to 
have in international relations.
15
 
Legitimacy questions therefore provide us with an insight into the kinds of challenges that 
international organizations face from a range of sources, and into the relations between 
international organizations and both their members and the wider world. While the specific 
challenges to and crises of legitimacy that international organizations face or have faced 
differ, they broadly fall into four categories.
16
  
The first are challenges to decision-making structures and practices, which are central to the 
procedural legitimacy of organizations. Such challenges can take a range of forms. They 
might focus on a lack of transparency – a challenge often raised against the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund, for example.
17
 They might highlight the role of particular 
powerful member states, and ascribe particular policy choices to their apparent hegemonic 
position, or focus on a lack of representativeness of decision-making organs, as in the UN 
Security Council and its five permanent members. Such challenges, while predominantly 
internal, mostly come from member states who feel excluded, or from their publics who 
identify the decision-making structures as elitist and non-democratic – a legitimacy challenge 
that has arguably been largely limited to the EU, with its unique reach into the domestic 
affairs of its member states. However, it can also come from actors outside an organization – 
such as the challenges by the US and European states to ASEAN’s legitimacy on the basis of 
its consensual decision-making and the opportunities for obstruction this was perceived to 
offer.
18
  
The second is the challenge of the non-compliance of member states with an organization’s 
decisions or rules. When Nigeria and other member states of the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) called on the UN Security Council to authorize military 
action in Cote d’Ivoire in 2011, and to intervene more forcefully in the post-election stand-off 
and protect civilians, they acted in direct contravention of the African Union’s decision to 
call for a political dialogue, as the military intervention targeted only one of the conflict 
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parties – the forces of President Laurent Gbagbo.  Similarly, the uses of force by the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the US and its allies in Kosovo (1999) and Iraq 
(2003) respectively are examples of non-compliance with an organization’s rules, as both 
challenged the restrictions in the UN Charter on the use of force without Security Council 
authorization. While international organizations also call on non-members (both states and 
non-state actors) to act in certain ways, and might be ignored, non-compliance by member 
states, especially powerful member states with a strong voice in the organization, obviously 
poses a much greater challenge to an organization’s legitimacy.  
Member states who want to limit the existing authority and autonomy of international 
organizations pose a third challenge to their legitimacy. These challenges question the 
existing authority relationships between international organizations and their members. An 
example of such a challenge is the efforts of recent British governments (and in particular 
conservative members of Parliament) to limit the authority of the EU and repatriate powers 
back to member states, in the process explicitly questioning the legitimacy of the EU’s 
exercise of certain powers.
19
 Efforts to restrict the UN’s involvement in the domestic affairs 
of states by members like Russia or China is another example. These challenges can arise for 
different reasons. An international organization might have pushed claims to authority to 
encroach upon the domestic jurisdiction of member states beyond the existing normative 
consensus and suffered from “normative overstretch” (as has been argued with respect to the 
UN Security Council’s broadened conception of threats to international peace and security).20 
Alternatively, changes in the balance of power might make some states both perceive the 
restrictions on their sovereignty that arise from an international organization’s authority as to 
restrictive and irksome, and might enable them to challenge them more effectively. Russian 
efforts to reduce the autonomy of Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) institutions such as the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
(ODIHR) over the last decade, and its electoral observer missions who have been critical of 
practices by Russia and its allies, are cases in point: the critical Russian position arguably 
reflects both the consolidation of an increasingly authoritarian regime and the re-emergence 
of Russia as an international power, and with it the greater desire and capacity to roll back 
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some of the liberal norms and institutions advanced by the OSCE in the wake of the end of 
the Cold War.
21
  
The final set of legitimacy challenges arises when the institutions and practices of 
international organizations conflict with, or no longer reflect, international norms. As 
discussed above, such norms are the benchmark against which the judgements about the 
legitimacy claims of international organizations are made. The association of the UN 
Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) with a “new international economic 
order” that emphasized greater state control over the allocation of resources, a greater voice 
of developing countries in international economic institutions, and a more favorable transfer 
of financial resources to developing countries. Such a focus might have strengthened its 
legitimacy in the 1960s and 1970s,
22
 but with changes in economic ideology in the 1980s 
such ideas – and the organization associated with them – became increasingly marginal, and 
in 2003 its headquarters in Geneva were described by one commentator as “a temple of a 
failed faith”.23 Also, regional norms that legitimate an organization might conflict with wider 
international norms and challenge the legitimacy of a regional organization in the light of 
external audiences, even if such regional normative frameworks are central to the 
organization’s legitimacy in the eyes of its member states. An example of this is the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO), whose legitimacy amongst some external (especially 
Western) audiences is compromised by its challenge to liberal norms,  While at the same time 
this challenge and the political and normative alternatives it opens up make it attractive and 
more legitimate to states who feel their interests threatened or marginalized by international 
organizations dominated by liberal Western states. 
These challenges to the legitimacy of international organizations highlight two important 
aspects of legitimacy. The first one is the inherently contested character of legitimacy: 
different audiences will have different legitimacy perceptions, and some will challenge the 
legitimacy claims of international organizations. Without unpacking these processes of 
contestation and the relationships they involve, it is difficult to make meaningful judgements 
about the degree of legitimacy of a particular organization.  
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The second aspect is the complex relationship between legitimacy and power. Legitimacy is 
seen as a source of power (and compliance); as an attribute of power, transforming “naked 
power” into authority;24 and as a constraint on power, imposing self-restraint on powerful 
actors.
25
 As the examples above highlight, power is also central to efforts to both maintain 
international organizations’ legitimacy and to challenge it. As David Beetham suggests:  
the important point to stress about the maintenance and reproduction of 
legitimacy – the maintenance of rules, the reproduction of beliefs, the 
continued expression of consent – is that these do not take place independently 
of the structures of power that they legitimate.
26
 
 Powerful states can deploy superior resources to influence the beliefs that legitimate both 
institutions and power relationships. While they cannot control these beliefs and the practices 
by which they are communicated, they have a dominant voice in the discourses that shape the 
norms against which legitimacy judgements are made.
27
  
Legitimation 
Legitimacy is not only an attribute of international organizations, but also a social practice: it 
needs to be claimed by those exercising authority and recognized in particular by those 
subject to it. Much of the legitimacy literature has focused on the latter: on the ways in which 
those subject to an organization’s authority recognize and validate its legitimacy claims. 
Domestically, the focus on democratic legitimation to validate the claims of office holders is 
a key example of this; while in international society, the emphasis on state consent for the 
generation of international legal obligations is one of the most prominent practices of 
recognizing the legitimacy of an organization.
28
 In international organizations, consent is 
                                                 
24
 Allen Buchahnan, ‘Political Legitimacy and Democracy’, Ethics, Vol.122 (2002), 689-719; Ian Hurd, 
‘Theories and tests of international authority’, in Bruce Cronin and Ian Hurd (eds.) The UN Security Council 
and the Politics of International Authority (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), 24-6 
25
 G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major 
Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Nico Krisch, ‘The Security Council and the Great Powers’. 
In Vaughan Lowe et.al. (eds.), The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and 
Practice since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 133-53. 
26
 Beetham, Legitimation of Power, 104. 
27
 See for example Jane Boulden, ‘Double Standards, Distance, and Disengagement: Collective Legitimization 
in the Post-Cold War Security Council’, Security Dialogue, Vol.37/3 (2006), 409-23; Andrew Hurrell, ‘Power, 
Institutions, and the Production of Inequality’, in Michael Barnett and Raymond Duval (eds.) Power in Global 
Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 33-58; Ngaire Woods, ‘The United States and the 
International Financial Institutions: Power and Influence within the World Bank and the IMF’ in Rosemary 
Foot, Neil MacFarlane, and Michael Mastanduno (eds.) US Hegemony and International Organizations 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 92-114. 
28
 Terry Nardin, ‘Legal Positivism as a Theory of International Society’, in David Maple and Terry Nardin 
(eds.), International Society: Diverse Ethical Perspectives (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 
17-35; Bruno Simma, ‘From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law: Bilateralism and 
primarily expressed through membership, and the acceptance of its rules and regulations that 
come with it. However, it can also be expressed through a range of day-to-day practices that 
confirm an organization’s legitimacy, ranging from rhetorical affirmation of an 
organization’s legitimacy claims (e.g., by emphasizing the importance of the WTO 
framework for global trade talks) to calls for decisions by an organization to authorize or 
endorse a particular course of action (e.g., the refusal of some European states to deploy their 
armed forces in peace operations without a UN Security Council mandate).  
Member states, however, are not the only community at which legitimacy claims are directed, 
and whose recognition and validation is sought. Recognition by outsiders who are not directly 
affected by a legitimacy claim, or who might be able to make rival claims, is also important. 
In international society, the most prominent example of this form of legitimation is the 
practice of state recognition, where the recognition by other states constitutes a political 
community as a member of the society of states with the concomitant rights and 
responsibilities, and legitimates its participation in the practices of international society. With 
regards to international organizations, such legitimation can be practiced by a least three 
kinds of actors: by other international organizations recognizing and affirming the activities 
of a particular organization; by non-member of an organization, especially great and regional 
powers that are politically, economically, or strategically important for many member states 
of an organization; and by prominent NGOs that can galvanize international public opinion.   
To be recognized, however, legitimacy needs to be claimed vis-à-vis these different 
audiences by international organizations and their members. Rodney Barker has called this 
process self-legitimation: “an action or series of actions – speech, writing, ritual, display – 
whereby people justify to themselves or others the actions they are taking and the identities 
they are expressing or claiming.”29 Thus, the ways in which international organizations make 
legitimacy claims and try to justify them can vary widely, reflecting differences in their 
mandates, the degree of institutionalization, and the character of their membership, and can 
range from mere rhetorical affirmation of a claim to investing into substantial organizational 
reforms to respond to international normative change, or challenges from member states, for 
example. 
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This understanding of legitimation raises three specific questions with regard to international 
organizations: First, what is the purpose of their legitimacy claims? Second, who legitimates? 
And third, who are the key audiences of these legitimation efforts?  
The Purpose of Legitimation  
International organizations engage in legitimation for three reasons. The first purpose of 
legitimation is to confirm the desirability of the status quo and to affirm existing authority 
structures and defend them against rival authority claims. Challenges to the status quo can 
come from both inside an organization or from actors outside it. Internal challenges often 
focus on the scope of an organization’s authority over its members (such as perennial efforts 
by recent British governments to repatriate EU powers), or on perceptions of unfairness in the 
distribution of power (e.g., the privileges of the permanent five members of the UN Security 
Council) or of decision-making processes (e.g., the decision-making processes in the 
WTO
30
). Challenges to an international organization’s authority can also come from outside 
actors, in particular from other international organizations or powerful states who question an 
organization’s authority over a particular issue. One example is the challenge to the UN 
Security Council’s charter-based monopoly on the authorization of the use of force other than 
in self-defense coming from the AU’s and ECOWAS’s claims about their role in the 
management of the use of force in their respective regions,
31
 or NATO and the US’s actual 
use of force without Council authorization in Kosovo and Iraq.  
The second purpose of legitimation efforts is the re-categorization or extension of authority 
relationships.
32
 As Clark argues, legitimation describes the processes by which the distinct 
normative beliefs of actors are reconciled and applied to a particular case.
33
 These processes 
of negotiating both applicable norms and the role that a particular international organization 
should play in their promotion or protection both lead to normative change and to changed 
understandings of the legitimate objectives and practices of international organisations. A 
good example of this is the rhetorical shift – reinforced by institutional changes – of the AU 
and ECOWAS from the traditional principle of non-interference towards the principle of 
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“non-indifference”, a highly interventionist norm that has served to justify a range of political 
and military interventions by both organizations, in particular in response to unconstitutional 
power grabs.
34
 Given the often substantial impact of such changes on the relationship 
between an organization and its member states, such efforts can be highly contested.  
The third purpose of legitimation efforts is to confirm legitimacy claims in the light of social 
and political change. Such changes can result in legitimacy gaps as the objectives and 
practices of an international organization no longer match the normative beliefs and 
expectations of its members: changes in the international balance of power and the 
composition of international society, for example, have challenged the legitimacy of the UN 
Security Council, and in particular the privileged hegemony of the permanent five members, 
chosen in 1945. Similarly, the changing character of conflict in Africa in the post-Cold War 
era, and the changing expectations of African states (many of which had democratized) 
towards an African regional organization undermined the legitimacy of the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU) and its key principle of non-intervention. Importantly, though, any 
social and political change is likely to affect different states in different ways, depending on 
their internal characteristics, their economic or military capacity, or their geopolitical 
position. Thus, rather than simply depriving international organizations of their normative 
underpinnings, such change opens them up for contestation again as the expectations of 
member states towards the organization diverge, or because previously existing differences 
come into the open.  
Who claims legitimacy? 
International organizations often strive to give the impression that they are single corporate 
entities, which act “in their own right”. In their resolutions and statements, it is often the 
organization as a collective, not the individual member states, which “criticizes”, “endorses”, 
or even ”authorizes” particular actions. The perception that they are relatively autonomous, 
corporate entities pervades much of the literature on the legitimacy of international 
organizations. It has led to suggestions that the study of bureaucracies offers a useful lens to 
understand the legitimacy and legitimation practices of international organizations, 
35
 and a 
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range of scholars have argued that like bureaucracies, international organisations embody 
what Weber has termed rational-legal authority: they have issue-specific authority (rather 
than the discretionary and plenipotentiary authority of a government), and their decision-
making is subject to closely prescribed and codified processes, which are well understood by 
the relevant audiences.
36
 Consequently, the legitimacy of their decisions can be rationally 
debated on the basis of these decision-making rules.  
There are limits, however, on the degree to which international organizations can be 
attributed agency and the powers and responsibilities which flow from it. While many 
organizations have an identity greater than the sum of their parts, their decision-making 
structures and processes are often ad-hoc, opaque, and dominated by a few powerful states, 
rather than based on the application of well-understood rules.
37
 As intergovernmental 
organizations,
38
 one of the central roles of international organizations is to act as a focal point 
for facilitating the cooperation between states to address collective action problems in a 
complex, globalized world. International organizations also act as frameworks through which 
states pursue the legitimation – and de-legitimation – of different conceptions of international 
order, and the role of respective international organizations within that order. Legitimation is 
therefore not only pursued collectively by an international organization as a whole, but also 
by different members individually, through the structures and processes of the organizations, 
and with reference to their mandates. Understanding their legitimation practices therefore 
requires not only looking at international organizations as relatively coherent, corporate 
entities, but also examining the practices of their member states, and unpacking the political 
dynamics occurring within the organizations. Most international organizations are therefore 
best understood as having a Janus-faced character, defying easy characterization as either  
coherent, autonomous supranational bodies or institutional frameworks for intergovernmental 
cooperation. With regard to the UN, Inis Claude prominently captured this in his notion of 
the “two United Nations” – the supranational UN of the Secretariat and its specialized 
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agencies on the one hand, and the UN of the member states in the Security Council and the 
General Assembly on the other.
39
  
This discussion of who engages in legitimation suggests that most international organizations 
are best considered as collective enterprises rather than unitary actors.  With this in mind, one 
can distinguish between efforts where the members of international organizations are 
consciously deliberating and acting collectively (e.g., when they decide on organizational 
reforms), and those instances in which particular member states are taking the lead in making 
legitimacy claims. These can also be described as collective or pluralist forms of legitimation 
respectively. Collective legitimation practices describe the efforts of international 
organizations and their members as coherent actors to improve the normative properties of an 
institution to defend or sustain authority claims against both internal and external challenges. 
Pluralist legitimation efforts, on the other hand, are conducted by individual states and groups 
of states. These states use the structures and processes of particular international 
organizations instrumentally to protect or promote their particular vision of international or 
regional order. As international organizations can offer a permissive environment for norm-
based discourses,
40
 and act as “repertoires of collective understandings” that structure norm-
based debates between states,
41
 they are a useful platform for states for such efforts.  
Who are the audiences? 
The legitimacy claims of international organizations are targeted at a range of different 
audiences. In an international order characterized by value pluralism and a diverse range of 
actors (both states and non-state actors), these distinct audiences have different interests, 
different expectations towards an organization, and different normative reference points 
against which they judge legitimacy claims. International organizations therefore face the 
challenge of reconciling these competing demands,
42
 and if the expectations towards an 
organization by different audiences conflict, they limit the political space within which 
different legitimation practices and objectives can be successfully reconciled. Examples of 
the tensions between different normative reference points for legitimacy judgements abound: 
the peace operations literature has increasingly focused on the tensions between international 
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and local conceptions of legitimacy,
43
 while an important part of the debate about EU 
legitimacy is framed in terms of a “democratic deficit”, where the EU and its institutions 
might be successfully legitimated vis-à-vis European elites, but not in the eyes of the wider 
population of the EU’s member states, as highlighted by the fate of the constitutional 
convention and treaty.
44
  
One can broadly distinguish between three types of audiences of international organizations’ 
legitimacy claims. The first audience is internal – member states and their publics. Given the 
association of legitimacy with authority, and thus with hierarchy and compliance, the 
relationship between international organizations and their members has received extensive 
attention in the literature. With regard to legitimation, it is important to note that member 
states themselves can often be deeply divided over a range of important issues that affect the 
scope of an international organization’s authority: even if an international organization 
reflects shared norms and values and advances common interests, states are frequently 
divided over the degree of authority that an organization should have with regard to its 
members, how centralized and supranational this authority should be, or what the best ways 
to promote particular objectives might be. Social change in particular can increase the 
differences between member states. In the case of the OSCE, for example, fissures between 
major members states (with Russia and former Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
members on the one hand, and the US and Western European states on the other) about the 
kind of regional order that the OSCE should help to uphold, and the degree of autonomy 
some of its bodies – e.g., electoral observation missions – should have, has deepened as both 
domestic Russian politics, and Russia’s political and economic international presence 
changed after the turmoil of the first post-Cold War decade.
45
 The normative divisions 
within the membership of international organizations, and the existence of multiple internal 
audiences for legitimacy claims on behalf of international organizations, highlight the 
importance of considering international organizations not only as actors legitimating other 
actors and practices, or as institutions in need of legitimation, but also as frameworks for 
contesting and legitimating different international orders. 
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Legitimacy relationships, however, are not only hierarchical, and many international 
organizations speak to – and seek recognition from – external audiences of non-member 
states, especially other international organizations, or great powers. This is particularly 
pronounced in the case of organizations that do not have a near-universal membership, or 
organizations whose members are not among the leading economic and military powers: 
since they are embedded into a wider global order that reflects the values, interests, and 
expectations of the major powers, they have to negotiate the requirements and expectations 
of this global order, in addition to those of their membership. Powerful global actors often 
fulfill important economic and security functions in a region, and might even financially 
support some of the core activities of international organizations in the developing world: 
most of the conflict resolution and peacekeeping activities of the African Union (AU), for 
example, have been financially supported by external actors, in particular the European 
Union.
46
 The AU therefore relies heavily on external support to be able to legitimise itself 
internally vis-à-vis its members and their publics. Failure to legitimate themselves vis-à-vis 
powerful external actors can therefore have significant material consequences if these actors 
withdraw their support or actively challenge an organization.  
An international organization might seek external recognition of its legitimacy claims to 
strengthen its legitimacy amongst its members: external material support can contribute to 
the capacity of an international organization to deliver on shared objectives of the 
membership and enhance its output legitimacy; or external recognition of its authority by 
other organizations of powerful states raises its legitimacy among member states. However, 
as internal and external values and expectations can also conflict, seeking external 
recognition of legitimacy claims can also detract from an organization’s legitimacy among 
its membership, and limit the political space available to an organization and its members 
within which to successfully pursue legitimation efforts.  
The third audience of legitimacy claims of international organizations are NGOs and civil 
society, who do not easily fall into the categories of internal and external audiences 
discussed above. NGOs can play an important role in the diffusion of norms (and thus the 
benchmarks against which different audiences assess the legitimacy of international 
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organizations and their practices),
47
 and in shaping and influencing international 
organizations’ policymaking.48 However, they are also an important audience for 
international organizations because through their advocacy and lobbying efforts, their ability 
to mobilize networks of activists, and their promotion of particular norms, they can 
legitimize international organizations vis-à-vis governments and their publics. NGOs can 
thus complement and reinforce the legitimation efforts of international organizations and 
their members.  
With respect to NGOs, the purpose of legitimation is not to achieve compliance with 
decisions or to engender material or political support. Legitimation towards NGOs and civil 
society is important as it can help to co-opt them into an international organization’s 
legitimation efforts. Still, some international organizations, especially in the security field 
and in the developing world, have often been reluctant to actively engage with NGOs and 
civil society.
49
 Other organizations, in contrast, such as the OSCE, have strong links with 
civil society.
50
 A prominent example of the re-affirming and legitimating role of NGOs is the 
International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, which has contributed to anchoring 
the “responsibility to protect” (R2P) in the language used to discuss humanitarian crises and 
conflicts,
51
 and has legitimated the role of the UN as the guardian of R2P.  
Legitimation and Institutional Reform: Isomorphic Mimicry? 
One of the most prominent forms of legitimation has been institutional reform: the change of 
existing organizational structures, or the creation of new ones. While few – if any – 
organizations have gone as far as the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which re-
invented itself as the African Union with a whole new organizational architecture and a 
much more intrusive mandate, many international organizations have over time reformed or 
complemented their existing institutions: ASEAN, for example, created a Human Rights 
Commission, the EU created institutions such as the European Central Bank, the UN created 
the Peacebuilding Commission, and even the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), 
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one of the most weakly institutionalized intergovernmental international organizations, 
created new structures including the Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS).  
The justifications for such organizational reforms seem to address two legitimacy concerns 
in particular. On the one hand, they are often attributed to a desire to more effectively 
promote shared interests and values – that is, to increase the output legitimacy of 
international organizations. The establishment of the AU’s Peace and Security Architecture 
(APSA), of the Peacebuilding Commission in the UN, or the SCO’s RATS are examples of 
this. Other reforms of organizational structures and rules – such as changes in working 
methods in the UN for example, or of expanded consultation mechanisms with NGOs and 
civil society in a wide range of organizations – are aimed at achieving greater representatives 
and openness in decision-making and contribute to greater procedural legitimacy.  
Importantly, not all of these institutional changes are targeted at strengthening the internal 
legitimacy of international organizations by strengthening the relevance of the organization 
to key members and their concerns. Especially in international organizations in the global 
South that rely on the support or recognition of external actors and do not count great powers 
amongst their members, institutional change is often targeted also at external audiences to 
sustain their recognition and support. These international organizations then pursue 
particular reforms not to achieve substantive changes in their practices or performance, but 
in response to outside pressures to conform to externally defined expectations and values – a 
process described by Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell as isomorphism.
52
 They identify 
three processes through which isomorphism works – coercive pressures, mimetic processes, 
and normative pressures – all of which are linked to issues of legitimacy.53 Coercive 
isomorphism, which works through external formal and informal pressures for organizational 
change to conform with wider norms, and mimetic isomorphism, where organizations 
emulate perceived well-functioning practices or institutions, engage both output and 
procedural legitimacy questions. Normative isomorphism affects practices through the 
influence of professional standards, as has been explored in the international relations 
literature on epistemic communities generating both shared understandings and practices 
with regard to particular issue areas,
54
 and engages with structural legitimacy. 
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A growing literature in international development that looks at the difficulties of institutional 
reform has identified isomorphic mimicry -- “the tendency to introduce reforms that enhance 
an entity’s legitimacy and support, even when they do not demonstrably improve 
performance”55 --  as one of the key reasons why institutional reforms in many developing 
countries have had so little traction. While formal changes are important to sustain the 
continued financial support from donors, governing elites aim to limit substantive changes 
that threaten their core interests or that might provoke conflicts within the state.
56
   In some 
international organizations, we might be observing similar processes. They pursue 
organizational reforms that mimic international norms to generate and sustain external 
legitimacy, and with it recognition and material support. However, the substantive impact of 
these changes on the actual practices and performance of these international organizations is 
limited by the conflicting interests and values of member states. There are a range of 
examples of such isomorphic practices. ASEAN’s establishment of a regional human rights 
system, for example, has been interpreted as the mimetic adoption of Western institutions to 
be recognized as advanced countries with internationally legitimate values.
57
 Similarly, 
regional organizations promoting economic integration, such as the South American trade 
organization MERCOSUR
58
, and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
have mimetically adopted practices and structures from arguably the most successful 
example of such integration, the EU.
59
 While some of these organizational changes might 
affect the performance of international organizations, others are instances of the primacy of 
form over function: as they are a response to external expectations and not the interests and 
values of an organization’s members, these changes might look like substantive reforms, but 
in terms of their substantive outcomes do not dramatically change the underlying structures 
of power an interest within a specific international organization.  
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Conclusion 
This chapter has aimed to examine the importance of legitimacy for international 
organizations, and the practices they deploy to generate and sustain legitimacy vis-à-vis 
different audiences. The discussion has highlighted four points.  
First, international organizations seek legitimacy not only for compliance from their 
members, but also from external actors to generate material support or recognition of their 
authority. The latter is particularly important for international organizations in the global 
South, whose membership does not include the leading economic, military, and political 
powers. As the growth of regional organizations is particularly pronounced in these parts of 
the world, it is important to recognize this direction of legitimation efforts, and its 
implications.  
Second, most international organizations are not homogenous, unitary actors, and do 
not necessarily engage in legitimation “as one”. Instead, legitimation efforts are mostly 
advanced by member states, sometimes collectively, and sometimes individually or by small 
groups. This suggests that these efforts not only seek to strengthen the legitimacy of an 
organization vis-à-vis different audiences, but also use the platform that an international 
organization offers to promote a particular vision of international order (including of the 
respective organization within it).  
Third, organizational reforms, which initially appear to most directly respond to 
internal legitimacy challenges, can often be an attempt at legitimation in response to external 
pressures. As a result, such efforts are likely to prioritize form over function and engage in 
“isomorphic mimicry”, with organizational changes not fundamentally challenging the 
underlying political structures and dynamics, but instead performed to signal to important and 
powerful external audiences that the organizations are deserving of continued material and 
political support. 
Finally, and arguably most important, legitimacy relationships and legitimation 
practices by international organizations are inextricably linked to the wider social and 
material international structures of power. These structures shape who legitimation efforts are 
addressed to; they affect the resources and practices that organizations can deploy towards 
generating and sustaining legitimacy; and they shape the social order, the normative reference 
points against which legitimacy judgements are made by different audiences. An international 
order that is characterized by value pluralism and only a shallow normative consensus, and 
where political and economic power (despite some diffusion) remain concentrated in a small 
number of states, means both that the political space within which international organizations 
and their members can pursue legitimacy is relatively constrained, and that their legitimacy it 
less a question of degree but one of perspective and audience.   
